Det Hvide Hus’ statusopgørelse til Senatets Armed Services Committee over, hvordan det går med med implementeringen af strategien i Afghanistan og Pakistan – samlet AFPAK – er blevet lækket. Rapporten er dateret 30. september, dækker formelt perioden frem til 30. juni og følger efter en tidligere afrapportering i marts. Rapporten ser ikke grund til at ændre strategien, der blev fastlagt i december sidste år – efter en proces, der er fyldigt beskrevet i Bob Woodwards nyeste bog, Obama’s Wars.

Rapporten er endnu et led i den amerikanske tradition for åbenhed i forvaltningen, som muliggør en større grad af indsigt i befolkningens regerings prioriteringer og handlinger end det er tilfældet andre steder.

Rapporten gør bl.a. i direkte termer status for den Pakistanske stats ringe evne til at følge op på de hårde militære fremskridt man har gjort de lovløse områder op mod Afghanistan med mere stabiliserende midler:

ReSOUrces and organizational constraints compl.icate Che
governance and development work necessary to prevent insurg!?l1ts
from regaining influence. aver the local popUlace. AH,hough
Islamabad recognhes the importance of the hold. and build phases
of COIN, its inability to OV€J:’Cf.>llIe \.hese ohallengeacQull!!
eventually turn last year’s operational successes into stalled
otrClt.eg.j.c effol.”t·s,
While the Pakistan military continues to suffer from deficiencies in critical COIN enablers – such as military intelligence, closle air support, and airlift – the more fundamental problem is their inability to transition to effective hold and build efforts in cleared areas. This failure results in short-lived military gains that allow militants to regroup in these areas. Resources and organizational constraints complicate the governance and development work necessary to prevent insurgents from regaining influence over the local popUlace. Although Islamabad recognizes the importance of the hold and build phases of COIN, its inability to overcome these challenges could eventually turn last year’s operational successes into stalled strategic efforts. (…)

Without the ability to stabilize post-conflict areas and to transfer forces from areas that have been cleared to ones needing to be secured, Pakistani military operations advanced slowly. Unless these challenges are overcome, the Government of Pakistan risks allowing the insurgency the opportunity to reestalish influence over a population that remains skeptikal of of its government’s staying power.

Se dokumentet her: WHITE HOUSE AFPAK OCT 2010

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